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The use of surety bonds in pretrial release has been under fierce
attack for a decade in the United States.' Beginning with complaints
about the detention of indigents, the attack ultimately upset the tra-
ditional justification for money bail. Surety bonds are usually unneces-
sary to guarantee appearance at trial; hence the cost of these bonds
to most defendants is unjustified. The most appalling aspect of the
bail system is the incarceration of indigents for inability to post a
bond. This detention causes loss of employment and disruption of
family life, prevents the defendant from adequately preparing for trial,
encourages him in criminal tendencies, 2 and increases his chances
of ultimate conviction.3 Against these injuries, and the obvious cost
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views expressed are those of the authors and not of the Ford Foundation or the officers
thereof.
t Chief Bail Commissioner (Circuit Court), State of Connecticut; BA. 1964 (history),
University of Colorado.
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1. See generally, Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in
Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. Rtv. 1031 (1954); Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis
in Bail: I & II, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 1125 (1965); LaFollette, Bail Bond Law Ad-
ministration: History, Criticisms, Release on Recognizance, 27 GAv_. 12 (1967); Stutz,
An Alternative to the Bail System, 8 CRana AND DEL QuENCY 12 (1962); Zander, Bail,.
A Re-Appraisal, 1967 Car. L. REv. 25, 100, 128 (1967); Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice
Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966 (1961); Comment, The Institution of Bail As Related to
Indigent Defendants, 21 LA. L. Rrv. 627 (1961). For early discussions of bail problems,
see, e.g., A. BEELEY, THE BArL Sv sfxs IN CHICAGo (1927); CauNAL JuSTl c Im CrtLva.;o
(R. Pound & F. Frankfurter eds. 1922). For a comparative law study of systems of prctrial
release, see Symposium: Conditional Release Pending Trial, 108 U. PA. L. RLv. 290 (1960).
2. Although statistical proof of the "jailhouse influence" on inmates is lacking, the
exposure, particularly of young persons, to hardened criminals is widely believed to have
the undesirable effect of encouraging criminal tendencies. See, e.g., P. F. Kennedy,
Criminal Justice, 5 AV.r. & M.ARY L REv. 167 (1964). Attorney General Kennedy wrote:
"This time in jail-prior to trial-is equivalent, in the words of Justice Douglas, 'to an
M.A. degree in crime.'" Id. at 171.
3. Wald & Rankin, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study,
39 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 681 (1964); Note, Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 1, at
1040; Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. PxM.
693 (1958). An early study showing similar results with respct to tie effect of pretrial
detention on disposition of cases at each stage of proceedings is Morse & 11eattie,
Survey of the Administration of Criminal justice in Oregon, 11 Onr.r . ,rv. (Supp. 193.).
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to the state of detaining these defendants, stands only the fear that
without the threat of bond forfeiture, the defendants would never
return to trial.
The contention that money bail is necessary to ensure the return of
the accused to trial was attacked and conclusively proved false by the
pioneer experiment in pretrial release conducted by the Vera Institute
of Justice in New York City.4 Vera's bold experiment proceeded on
the premise that if a defendant has roots in his community, especially
through family ties or employment, he will return to trial even with-
out the imposition of a surety bond. Screening defendants on the basis
of a point-system interview, Vera gradually eased the criteria for its
recommendations that the court release a defendant on his own re-
cognizance. The hypothesis proved correct: the rate of willful non.
appearance remained constant as releases without bond were vastly
increased.
With the impetus of the Vera experiment, the bail reform move-
ment grew into a challenge to the whole system of money bail. On the
federal level, the new enlightenment in bail resulted in the Bail Re-
form Act of 1966.1 On the state level, a wave of bail reform projects,
virtually all based on the Vera model, swept the United States.0 Prob-
ably the most ambitious of these reform projects was undertaken by
the Connecticut General Assembly in 1967. The purpose of this Note
is to describe the project, which went beyond Vera in several impor-
tant respects, and until it was severely truncated in mid-1969, showed
spectacular results.
The most remarkable features of the Connecticut program were,
first, that it went far beyond an experimental model, to establish an
independent bail commission operating statewide;7 and second, that
4. Formerly known as the Vera Foundation, the Institute made the important decision
to move away from money bail in the release of defendants. In the Manhattan Thall
Project, Vera workers used a point system to determine a defendant's risk of flight, and
thus his eligibility for liberal release terms. For detailed examinations of the Vera story,
see Address of Herbert J. Sturz, Director, Manhattan Bail Project, POCEDIS~o s, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTIcE 43 (1064); D. FREED & P. ,VALD, BAIL IN 'rLm
UNrrED STATES: 1964, at 59 (1964); Botein, The Manhattan Dali Project: Its Impact on
Criminology and the Criminal Law Processes, 43 TEE. L. Rnv.319 (1965).
5. Pub. L. No. 89-465 (June 22, 1966); enacting 1s U.S.. §§ 3146-3152, aending
§§ 3041, 3141-3143 and 3568 (1966).
6. See generally BAIL AND SUMMeONS: 1965, at 9 (1965); Freed 8- Wald, supra note 4,
at 56-69; INTERIa! REPORT, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICCe xvlI-xx
(1965); Paulsen, Pre-trial Release in the United States, 66 CoLum. L. Itv. 109 (1966),
Note, Bail Reform in the State and Federal Systems, 20 VAND. L. Rtv. 948 (1967); Ken-
nedy, VISTA Volunteers Bring About Successful Bail Reform Project in Baltimore, 54
A.B.A.J. 1093 (1968); Note, Bail: An Examination of Release on Recognizance, 29 MISS,
LJ 303 (1968)
7. The Connecticut Bail Commission was unique among bail agencies in that It
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The Connecticut Bail Commission
virtually all bailable offensess were subject to the new administrative
procedure it created. Incorporated into the state judicial department,
the agency was dependent on neither local nor foundation financing.
The most striking achievement of the Bail Commission was vastly to
increase the release rate of defendants without a surety bond, from
about 21 per cent of arrests on bailable offenses to 61 per cent on a
statewide basis, while holding constant the rate of non-appearance."
I. Origin of the Commission
Ground was broken in the area of bail reform in Connecticut in
February, 1965, when the General Assembly authorized judges to re-
lease defendants on their own recognizance at arraignment in Circuit
Court.1 0 Standing alone, however, this authorization had little impact.
Under the authority of the 1965 Act, Connecticut judges promulgated
a resolution in December, 1965, which carried "own recognizance"
releases to the station-house level. Police at their discretion were au-
embraced the entire state; other bail programs operate only on the municipal, county
or federal district level. Also, other programs have been staffed by existing agencies,
using probation officers, family relations personnel or social workers, or have relied on
volunteers such as VISTA workers or students.
8. "Bailable offenses" as used in the Bail Commission statute indudes all criminal
arrests except those for capital offenses and summons-t)e motor vehicle offenses. such as
passing a stop sign. Serious motor vehicle offenses are subject to arrest and bail (see
CONN. GFN. STAT. § 14-140). Throughout the periods under discussion, including the
Commission period, "common drunks" were administratively excluded from the category
of bailable offenses. The classification "common drunks" includes those who have a long
history of arrests for drunkenness, and represents a total of about 15 per cent of all ar-
rests on a statewide basis. Many of these "offenders" have no real wissh to leave the police
lock-up and do not attempt to post a bond. From the beginning of the Bail Conmis-
sion these persons were excluded from interviews, as well as from the statistical tabula-
tion of bailable offenses, on the theory that in most cases, an interview by a bail
commissioner would be merely a sham.
The Bail Commission made the initial bail determination for all arrests on bailable
offenses, except those made pursuant to a bench warrant from the Superior Court.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-63c; § 5443 (1968). In Connecticut, the base-line trial court is
the Circuit Court; this system of courts processes 97 per cent of all criminal arrests. Al-
though the Superior Court decides cases of felonies carrying a maximum sentence of
more than five years, initial disposition of these cases, in a hearing for probable cause,
is made at the Circuit Court level. The prosecutor may ask the Superior Court judge to
issue a bench warrant for the arrest of a defendant; in such cases, the probable cause
hearing at the Circuit Court is omitted, and all proceedings take place at the Superior
Court level. These bench warrants account for only three per cent of criminal arrests.
9. Budgetary complaints and the conservative political atmosphere of mid-1969 re-
sulted in a sharp cutback of the bail program. Initial bail determination was restored
to the police; the bail commission was reduced in both authority and manpoer. Pub.
Act No. 826, § 2 (July 1, 1969); § 54-63c(a), [1969] Conn. Legis. Serv. 1257. But recent
data suggest that the period of liberal bail procedures will have a lasting beneficial
effect on the operation of bail in Connecticut. See pp. 525-26 infra.
10. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-16 (1968). The Act provided that the judge of any Circuit
Court may, at his discretion, release on his own recognizance any person accused of
an offense which is bailable.
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thorized" to set a $150 non-surety bond for any person accused of a
misdemeanor.12 The police response, for reasons to be discussed later,
was not notably enthusiastic. By December, 1967, the number of per-
sons released under the $150 non-surety bond had crept from an esti-
mated 3 per cent to 21 per cent of bailable defendants. 1
More substantial reform was made possible when the General As-
sembly in early 1967 set up the Bail Commission as an independent
state agency for the determination of bail.14 The impetus for an inde-
pendent bail organization came largely from the judiciary, 16 on the
basis of a sucessful experiment in pretrial release which had been con-
ducted in New Haven.' 6 The Assembly freed the agency from an
advisory role; the bail commissioner was given full authority to make
the initial bail determination, in effect subject only to review by
the courts.' 7 The Commission had a staff of eighteen commissioners,
11. Pursuant to this 1965 resolution, judges provided the police with an interview
form with specific release standards based largely on the community ties of the defendant.
However, there was a considerable amount o7 controversy over the legal authority of
the judges' resolution. Some police departments refused to go along with the new pro-
cedure, on the grounds that the General Assembly had not intended to extend release
on recognizance to the station house, but only to the arraignment proceeding.
12. The distinction between a simple written promise and a non-surety bond, Ingtitu.
tionalized in Connecticut in 1967 by the Bail Commission Act, is somewhat Illuio0y,
Theoretically, when a defendant "posts" a non-surety bond, he is obligated to the state
for the amount of the bond in the event he fails to appear at trial. Some ball com-
missioners tended to favor one method of release over the other. However, in practical
effect the two methods of release are virtually identical; never has a non.surety bond
been collected in Connecticut. For purposes of this discussion, the two methods of releaze
have been treated as equally "liberal," as opposed to the traditional surety bond.
13. This figure of 21 per cent is the result of a compilation of bail dispositions of
bondable offenders during December, 1967. This compilation is contained in tie lengthy
report, "An Analysis of Personnel Needs and Costs of the Proposed Connecticut Bail
Commission," on file at the Yale Law Journal. This report was used as the basis for
Bail Commission planning.
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-63a-g (1968).
15. The initial impetus for a statewide bail commission came largely from the then
Chief Judge of the Circuit Court, Jay E. Rubinow, and the Director of the New Haven
Legal Assistance Association, Frederick W. Danforth, Jr. In late 1966, Judge Rubinow
requested the New Haven Legal Assistance Association to prepare a draft of a model
bail reform act for submission to the 1967 term of the General Assembly. The ensuing
draft formed the basis of Public Act 549, which was introduced to the Assembly in
January 1967. The bill was endorsed by the Connecticut Bar Association, Governor
John Dempsey and various civil rights groups. Perhaps the most effective proponentg
of the act were Judge Rubinow, Mr. Danforth, and Judge Robert Testo, who was then
Speaker of the Connecticut House of Representatives.
16. The New Haven program was set up with private funds in August, 1965, to Inter-
view defendants who had not been able to post a surety bond at arraignment, and who
thus were detained at jail. As director of the program, author O'Rourke supervised a
team of student interviewers who made recommendations to the court concerning re-
laxation of release conditions. Over the experiment period the rate in New Haven of
releases on "own recognizance" was substantially higher than the estimated statewide
rate during this period. For a detailed examination of the New Haven experiment, tee
O'Rourke and Salem, A Comparative Analysis of Pretrial Release Procedures, 1968 CUAE
AND DELINQUENCY 867.
17. In case a serious dispute arose over the propriety of the bail commissioner's
action, police could request the prosecuting attorney to delay the release proceeding
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one for each of the eighteen circuits in the state; and every circuit
had two or more assistant commissioners, depending on the volume
of arrests, for a total staff of sixty-one.18 Because of delays in funding,
the Commission did not begin actual operations until October 1, 1968.
The release standards used by the Commission were patterned to a
great extent on those developed in the Manhattan Bal Project,10 ex-
cept that no formal point system was used in interviewing the ar-
rested person. Great emphasis was placed on ties to the community,
whether through family, residence or employment; and the standard
interview form provided for "discretionary factors," such as age or
pregnancy, which would support further leniency. 0 One important
feature of the system was that it was weighted in favor of release on a
written promise or non-surety bond;21 if a traditional surety bond was
set for the defendant, the interviewing commissioner was required
to state his reasons for the harsher measure. The interview form,
while protected from subpoena by the prosecuting attorney,' could
be used as evidence of unnecessary detention if the defendant sought
judicial review of the bail proceeding.
II. Operation of the Commission
The effect of the Bail Commission was immediate and dramatic. By
the second month of operation, a plateau in the statewide nonsurety
release ratem had been reached, at about 60 per cent of bailable
arrests, although this percentage varied considerably from circuit to
circuit.2 4 To a great extent these variations can be ascribed to the
different backgrounds and personal inclinations of the bail com-
missioners.2
until the next regular session of the Circuit Court. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-63c(b). This
procedure to check the bail commissioner was invoked only once, to the knowledge of
the Chief Bail Commissioner.
18. In each of the twelve smallest circuits, there was one commissioner and two
assistants; in the six largest, one commissioner and three assistants. In addition, one
"commissioner at large" was employed to work in various circuits when needed.
19. See note 4 supra.
20. A criminal record, even a serious one, did not necessarily preclude releare on a
non-surety bond. However a person who had been arrested frequently in the recent
past or who had pending charges against him was generally not released, especially if
in the pending case the arrested person had been released on a non-surety bond.
21. See note 12 supra.
22. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-63d (1968).
2.. "Non-surety release rate" is used here and subsequently to mean both release
under a non-surety bond and release on a written promise.
24. For example, Circuit 15 showed a non-surety release rate of 80 per cent, while
Circuit 14, at the other extreme, released only 36 per cent on non-surety measures. Se
Appendix I, infra p. 529.
25. Although a precise correlation is impossible, we strongly feel that the variations
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By the end of its period of unrestricted operation, the Commission
achieved an overall non-surety release rate of 61 per cent of bailable
offenses. When measured against the results of other bail reform proj-
ects, this figure is particularly striking. In almost all the other projects,
numerous categories of defendants were eliminated from the possi-
bility of interview and release. 26 In Connecticut, no such categories
were put "off limits" because of a theoretical expectation of non-
appearance.2
7
Under the Bail Commission, the rate of initial non-appearances was
about 2.8 per cent. It is important to note however that the definition
of "non-appearance" upon which this percentage is based is very strict.
it reflects the absolute number of defendants who were absent when
their cases were called before the courts, without regard to the 'will-
fulness of the non-appearance. In many cases in which a defendant
fails to appear, the failure is due to oversight on the part of the defen-
depended very little on differences in the types of offenses committed in the various
drcuits. By and large, those commissioners with the fewest preconceptions about ball,
or criminal justice in general, most thoroughly accepted the idea of a liberal policy of
release. Those bail officers with previous experience in the criminal courts proved more
reluctant to abandon the old notion of the necessity for money bail.
The Chief Bail Commissioner was obliged to explain in its entirety the system of
bail and traditional surety bonds' to more than half the prospective commissionerg,
Beginning with virtually no preconceptions, these commissioners readily accepted the
importance of community ties in determining a defendant's eligibility for non.surety
release. Those commissioners with more knowledge of the existinF ball system conl-
tinued to depend to a greater extent on the use of surety bonds. This effect of previous
knowledge and conceptions of bail is mihgnified when bail is set by the police officers
themselves (see p. 524 infra). The problem of educating police departments to the
virtues of non-surety release can in no way be divorced from the problem of "dis,
educating" them from their habitual conceptions of bail.
26. In the Manhattan Bail Project, the leading example, about 20 per cent of dIe.
fendants contacted in the detention pen were excluded from interview because of tile
nature of the offense category; "most narcotics offenses, homicide and certain sex crimes"
were excluded. Sturz, supra note 4, at 50. Where the interviewer recommended release
conditions to the court, the rate of such recommendations for release on recognizance
gradually grew from 29 per cent to 65 per cent of interviewed defendants. Id. at 45-40.
But the New York courts accepted the Vera recommendations in only about 60 per cent
of the cases. Id. at 45. Although in Connecticut the courts occasionally set a surety bond
when the defendant had been released on a written promise or non-surety bond, the
extreme infrequency of this procedure weighs little against the virtually plenary power
of the commissioners to set release conditions.
27. The only categories officially excluded were common drunks and arrests under
a Superior Court bench warrant. See note 8, supra. There was, however, a certain amount
of de facto exclusion because of police pressure and the unwieldy docket system of
the Superior Court. See pp. 521-23 infra.
On the point of the relationship between the bail commissioner and the court, It Is
notable that the commissioner worked most efficiently at the station-house level, If the
commissioner waited to make his bail determination at court, he had to become Involved
in the formal court procedure, by making a motion for whatever release conditions he
deemed appropriate; and this motion was of course subject to objection by the prosecutaing
attorney. If the release was at the station house, much less of the commissioner's thne
was required, and the bail determination was rarely changed before trial. For various
reasons, however, a few commissioners preferred to make all their recommendations in
court.
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dant or his lawyer as to the date, or the time of day or the courtroom.
Oversleeping, family problems and other similar causes contribute
to non-appearance. While Connecticut statistics dividing the willful
from the negligent non-appearances are not available, it is estimated
thatthe willful "skip" rate was about 1.4 per cent.28
Perhaps the most persuasive indication that the Connecticut skip
rate was minimal comes from a comparison with figures released by the
Surety Association of America, the national bondsmen's organization.
The Association reports that losses from bond forfeitures are about
2.4 per cent.29 This figure is based upon willful, ultimately successful
"skips" by defendants; that is, only those instances are shown in which
the bondsman was never able to bring the defendant to court. Bonds-
men almost invariably are given a considerable length of time to
produce the bonded defendant before the bond is forfeited;:M and even
after the forfeiture, the bondsman is usually eligible for a refund if he
returns the defendant to court within a reasonable period.31 Thus the
Connecticut rate of 2.8 per cent for all non-appearances, with a willful
non-appearance rate estimated at 1.4 per cent, reflects a situation more
favorable than the national rate of bond forfeitures of 2.4 per cent.32
28. The results in Connecticut were comparable to the Manhattan project, where
careful records were kept. Vera workers announced a one per cent "skip rate" with an-
other one and one-half per cent who "did miss one or more court appearances, but, then
either returned voluntarily or were rounded up by Vera Staff within a few da)s." Sturz,
supra note 4, at 48.
In almost every case of non-appearance where the defendant was released on non.surety
bond or written promise, the commissioner performed the function of a paid bondsman,
and made an effort, ordinarily successful, to round up the truant defendant. The bail
commissioner's standard operating procedure was to send the defendant a letter ex-
plaining that he had missed his appearance at court. The letter also pointed out that
continued non-appearance would lead to a criminal offense; in the case of accused
misdemeanants, it was a misdemeanor, while for accused felons, it was a felony. When
possible, the bail commissioners also telephoned the defendant.
29. Milwaukee Journal, March 11, 1964, cited in Freed & Wald, supra note 4, at 29
n.25.
30. Freed & Wald, supra note 4, at 28.
31. Id. In Connecticut, for ease of collection, the surety amount may also be com-
promised, so that the bondsman actually is liable for an amount smaller than that
pledged in the bond. And for the success of the Connecticut bondsmen in persuading
the General Assembly to raise to six months the period which elapses before bonds are
forfeited, see note 36 infra.
32. When we move from the rate of non-appearance to actual numbers, it may be
true that under the liberal release policies the group of defendants who fail to appear
is slightly larger than under surety bond release. The reasoning behind this conclusion
is as follows: with the surety bonds set, a certain proportion of defendants were detained
because of their indigence. Under the Bail Commission, most of these defendants are
released. If we can assume that the rates of release and non-appearance applicable to
the entire defendant population are valid for the segment of indigent defendants, then
IA per cent of these defendants would also willfully fail to appear at trial; that is,
about 1.4 per cent of the defendants who would not have made bail under the old
system, and who remained in jail until trial, would fail to appear at trial under the
more liberal system of release. Even if the skip rate for released indigents were somewhat
higher than for the defendant population as a whole, it would be very hard to maintain
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In the Connecticut program, then, a major increase in the rate of
non-surety release was achieved without an adverse effect upon non-
appearances. On the basis of its accomplishments before it was cut
back, the Connecticut experience is a model of successful bail liberal-
ization.
III. Imposition of Surety Bonds
For a number of reasons, the commissioners set ordinary surety
bonds in 39 per cent of bailable arrests. Some of these defendants were
non-residents, for whom non-surety release was not believed justified.8u
In many instances, the personal biases of particular commissioners pre-
vented the forthright application of Bail Commission release stan-
dards; these commissioners simply were never convinced of the efficacy
of non-surety measures and used them sparingly. Often, however,
surety bonds were set because of external pressures irrelevant to the
purpose of bail. These pressures, in the form of police bias and tradi-
tion, an uncertain docketing procedure in the higher state courts, and
the practice of setting bonds to match high mandatory fines, will be
met in other jurisdictions where bail is reorganized; for this reason
they bear consideration in some detail. If these pressures were elim-
inated, and the recalcitrant commissioners persuaded to use non-surety
that this slight numerical increase in non-appearanccs justified the abandonment of
the non-surety release program. The cost to the community of the slightly increased
skips, in terms of pretrial "recidivism" or of loss of "deterrent" effect of the criminal
sytem, certainly would be more than offset by the well documented evils of the surety
bond system. The detained defendant is demoralized, subject to the influence of pro.
fessional criminals, forced to lose his pay, to see his family deteriorate, and perhaps
worst of all, is much more likely to be convicted than his counterpart who was able to
post bail. See p. 513 supra. To these effects on the defendant must be added the In-
creased money costs to the state for the extra days of detention in jail.
33. The effect of using non-surety release for defendants without community ties--or
the virtual abolition of money bail--can only be guessed at; no experiment has attempted
to extend non-surety release to these defendants. It is certain that the rate of non-
appearance for non-resident defendants is substantially higher than for residents, even
where a surety bond is used. The question in moving to non.surety release is whether
the non-appearance rate for non-residents would go even higher without the threat of
bond forfeiture. The authors speculate that it would not. If a defendant is thinking
of fleeing before trial he must be principally concerned with the legal consequences of
his flight, rather than his money debt to the bondsman; that is, skipping bail will
probably cause an additional jail term if he is ultimately apprehended, and It is the
probability of this additional punishment which determines the defendant's decision.
The use of non-surety release, of course, would not affect the additional penalties for
flight. The only justification for the use of bonds for non-residents must be the policing
function of the bondsman; because of his large stake in the defendant's appearance, the
bondsman may be motivated to search for the defendant more vigorously than state
resources would allow the bail commissioner, or even the police, to do. Whether or
not these returns outweigh the inequities of detaining indigent non-residents, and the
money costs of bonds to non-residents who are able to afford their release, is a question
which certainly merits further study.
520
The Connecticut Bail Commission
release less hesitantly, the setting of surety bonds could be reduced to
perhaps 10 to 15 per cent of bailable arrests; that is, up to 90 per cent
of defendants would be eligible for non-surety release.
External pressures prevented the application of standard Bail Com-
mission release criteria, and surety bonds were almost invariably set,
in the following areas:
(1) Serious felonies. As least two factors in addition to their own
predilections discouraged commissioners from using non-surety release
where the offense carried a possible sentence of more than five years.
First, the police often put considerable pressure on the commissioners
to set surety bonds.3 4 The reason for this pressure was their feeling that
an "easy" release for a defendant charged with a serious offense would
both damage police morale and fail to provide sufficient assurance that
the defendant would return for trial. Available statistical evidence, how-
ever, undercuts the assumption that a serious offense demands a high
surety bond to assure appearance at trial.35
Second, judges demanded surety bonds for defendants charged with
serious offenses, because of a defect in Connecticut criminal procedure.
After arraignment in the Circuit Court, a defendant charged with a
serious felony is usually bound over to the Superior Court to await
trial. Because of the large backlog of pending cases, many montls usu-
ally elapse before the defendant comes to trial in Superior Court; and
34. Although legally independent of the police, the bail commissioners necessarily
maintained reasonably cordiai relations with the police. The majority of their inter-
views were conducted within the police stations; and in the rural circuits, where distance
often made the "interview" proceeding merely a telephone conversation 'ith the
arresting officer, full police co-operation was vital. Similarly, the size of the Bail Com-
mission staff prohibited having a commissioner on duty at all times; commissioners were
instead "on call" during hours of infrequent arrests. Thus arrests at extremely late
hours were often handled by a telephoned interview. In almost one-third of all arrests
the defendants "waived" an interview by a bail commissioner. These waivers were almost
entirely in the rural circuits and were the result of the shortage of commissioners in re-
lation to the distances to be traveled. An interview could be waived only in the event
that the defendant would be able to meet the release conditions imposed upon him by
the local police, in the bail commissioner's absence.-Since the percentage of extremely
poor defendants, as well as of serious offenses, is lower in rural than in urban areas, the
usual situation in the case of a "waiver" was that the police set a non-surety bond
or a relatively low surety bond, which the defendant posted. Often the bail com-
missioner was consulted by telephone as to the propriety of the release; but these
brief consultations were often not recorded as formal "interviews," and hence a ",'aiver"
notation was recorded. In no case did the "waiver" represent detention of a defendant.
In the urban areas, where distance presented no problem, virtually all defendants were
interviewed. The commissioner's role in the "waiver" practice was legally obscure; tech-
nically the police officers could have required the commissioner to appear for the inter-
view, at whatever hour or distance. Hence, cordial relations with the police were
necessary.
55. The Philadelphia Bail Study concluded that the vast majority of bond forfeitures
are for minor violations, such as gambling, liquor or traffic offenses. Few forfeitures are
for serious crimes. Note, Compelling Appearance in Court, supra note 1, at 10P2_
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the date of the trial is not announced to the defendant or his counsel
until just before the trial is to take place. It is felt that this late notice
of the trial increases the probability of non-appearance. By setting a
surety bond, the court shifts responsibility for ensuring appearance at
trial to a professional bondsman. Recently, there has been some move-
ment among Circuit Court judges toward using non-surety devices in
bind-over cases, probably as a result of the Bail Commission success.80
But until Superior Court docket practices are improved, this pressure
to require surety bonds will remain.
(2) Minor narcotics offenses. Although users of "hard," addictive
drugs have long been thought to present a special problem in the area
of pretrial release, few responsible critics suppose that extra measures
are needed with respect to the typical youthful defendant arrested for
possession of marijuana. In Connecticut, such arrests have increased
more than 200 per cent during the last two years. 7 But in most of these
cases the bail commissioners responded to pressure by police and prose-
cutors, and continued to set surety bonds, usually at $500 or $1000.
(3) Offenses of resisting, vilifying, or abusing a police officer. Here,
surety bonds were invariably set, even though during the unrestricted
Commission period the offense carried a maximum sentence of three
months,8" which was itself rarely imposed. Perhaps understandably,
police seek retribution for these offenders. But so long as assuring
appearance in court remains the only stated basis for release standards,
police insistence on a surety bond in these situations is a clear abuse.
(4) Offenses carrying high mandatory fines. For certain offenses carry-
ing high mandatory fines, surety bonds were usually set in an amount
not less than the fine. A prime example of this type of offense is driving
under suspension. The related offense of driving without a license usu-
ally carries a fine of about $25; but for driving under suspension, the
minimum fine is $100, and the fine imposed is often higher, depending
on the defendant's driving record. Invariably, a surety bond of at least
$100 is set in the offense of driving under suspension; the rate of non-
36. And the Superior Court personnel are not opposed to use of non-surety releases In
bindovers; they have told author O'Rourke that they only wish to have a follow-up
agency as efficient as the bondsman. The Bail Commission Act has been interpreted
so that the commissioners operate only at the Circuit Court level: greater manpower
would be required to extend the commissioners' follow-up service to the Superior Court
system.
37. See New Haven Journal-Courier, Oct. 27, 1969, at 7, col. 1-2; and interview with
John J. Daly, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court, Jan. 29, 1970.
38. The 1969 legislature changed the maximum sentence for resisting, abusing or
vilifying a police officer from a *250 fine and/or six months in jail to a $500 fine and/or
five years in jail. Pub. Act No. 452, § 4 (June 18, 1969); § 53-165, [1969) Conn. Legis.
Service 479. This Act was inspired by fear of riots; it also extended coverage to firemen.
522
Vol. 79: 513, 1970
The Connecticut Bail Commission
appearance is ordinarily quite high, and the bond forfeiture serves as
the fine. In such cases most commissioners were unwilling to give a
non-surety ruling.39 This special use of surety bonds, although it does
not stem from the general purpose of ensuring appearance at trial, is
a handy device which is unlikely to be disturbed by the most radical
bail reorganization. Although perhaps a quibble, it would be preferable
to justify this matching of mandatory fines with bonds on other grounds;
for this discussion, it is sufficient to note that the release statistics are
depressed by the surety bonds set in these cases.
Even without statutory or administrative changes in the criminal
justice system, time would certainly have reduced the commissioners'
caution and the effectiveness of police pressure. As the bail commis-
sioners felt more secure in their roles vis-.-vis the police and the
courts,40 they undoubtedly would have moved toward more reasonable
release conditions in all areas. The Chief Bail Commissioner feels
strongly that a non-surety rate of 85-90 per cent could eventually have
been reached without a rise in the rate of non-appearance.A
IV. Curtailment of the Commission
The Connecticut bail program was severely curtailed by the General
Assembly in June, 1969.42 Although the primary motivation for the
cutback was economy,43 political patronage in appointing Commission
39. When a defendant is arrested for driving without a license, a surety bond of St00
is set because police cannot easily determine whether the defendant is driving under
suspension or without a license; these defendants are often unable to post bonds. Such
cases are normally continued for at least three weeks, for a transcript of the defendant's
motor vehicle license record to be supplied from the state; that is, a defendant who
cannot make bail is made to suffer in jail an inordinately long time. Yet here too the Bail
Commissioners feel constrained not to depart from the practice of setting surety bontds.
40. The employtnent status of the commissioners was curiously unstable. Because the
Commission was funded out of the judicial department budget, each commissioner
was required to sign a "work agreement," which stated that in case of budget reductions
he might be obliged to retire. This notice of the perhaps temporary nature of dic
employment, in addition to the political attacks on the Bail Commission beginning
in January, 1969, probably dampened any adventurous moves by the commissioners
toward reformation of the "problem" offenses which have been outlined.
41. Six circuits were consistently lower than the state average of 61 per cent non-
surety releases, principally because of conservativisin among the bail commissioners. If
these circuits had moved to higher release rates, the state average would have been
boosted considerably. See Appendices I & II infra. Further, it is likely that challenges to
high surety bonds, on due process or equal protection grounds, may result in a loosening
of release policies in some of the problem areas. And some day, of course, courts may
require non-surety release if sufficient evidence is presented of community ties. But
discounting the possibility of judicial intervention, forthright application of standard
release policies across the board would certainly have raised the non-surety release
rate substantially.
42. The bill which changed the Commission status was Pub. Act No. 826 (July 1.
1969); § 54-63, [19691 Conn. Legis. Service 1257-58. One important factor in pusage
of the measure was the organized lobbying of professional bondsmen, whose profits had
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staff also drew fire; and in a "law and order" climate, the Bail Com.
mission was unfortunately seen as a "pro-defendant" program. The staff
of the Commission was cut from sixty-one to twenty-eight. Initial bail
determination was returned to the police, and the role of the bail com-
missioner was reduced to interviewing only those defendants who have
been unable to post the bail bond set by the police.44 As to this group,
the commissioner has discretion to reduce the amount of the bond
or to change the release conditions to a written promise or non-surety
bond. Thus indigents remain protected to some extent against bail
abuses.
The non-surety release rate declined to 35 per cent after the police
took over initial bail determination on July 1, 1969.45 Police officers
are as a rule unenthusiastic about departure from traditional bail bonds
as a means of release. 46 Unless motivations and incentives for police,
such as a reduction in their workload, are built into the system, they
are unwilling to alter their usual methods. Moreover, in some classes of
offenses, such as resisting arrest, bonds are set as a kind of pretrial pun-
ishment; this punitive effect is felt even when the defendant is able to
post bond, in the form of the bondsman's charges. In addition, in some
police stations there is a natural working relationship between the
police officers and the bondsmen which tends to increase the use of
surety bonds. Since bondsmen are often in a position to do favors for
police,47 the police are naturally sympathetic to them.
It is disturbing to observe that the Connecticut General Assembly did
not seem inclined to debate the Bail Commission's effectiveness in terms
naturally dwindled during the Commission period. Bondsmen also succeeded in getting
bond rates raised substantially, Pub. Act No. 206 (May 21, 1969); § 29-151, [1969] Conn,
Legis. Service 188, and in having the period which must elapse before a bond is officially
forfeited extended to six months, Pub. Act No. 512 (June 24, 1969); § 52-316, (1969)
Conn. Legis. Service 630-31.
43. The annual salary for a bail commissioner is $6670; for an assistant bail com-
missioner, $5240. The estimated total budget of the Bail Commission for the first year
of operation, including three months of reduced activity, was $400,000.
44. Pub. Act No. 826, § 2 (July 1, 1969); § 54-63c, [1969] Conn. Legis. Service 1257-8,
45. See Appendix II infra.
46. There are notable exceptions in which police departments are releasing defendanta
on non-surety measures at rates near or equal to the Bail Commission. Under the
direction of State Police Commissioner Leo Mulcahy, the Connecticut State Police as
early as December, 1965, adopted a written interview form for setting bail and the use
of non-surety release. Although precise statistics are unavailable, Commissioner Mulcahy
has reported a high non-surety release rate, with about a one per cent "skip rate." In
addition, during July and August, 1969, 31 of the 81 local police departments released
on non-surety devices at least 50 per cent of all arrested persons.
47. For example, a former practice in urban areas was that when the police wished to
have a defendant who was an informer released from jail, the bondsman often posted the
surety bond for the informer without making the usual bondsman's charge. With the Bail
Commission standard, however, it is rarely necessary for the informer to be released by
this circuitous method, since most informers bay be supposed to have "community ties."
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of either the non-surety release rate or the low "skip rate." To be sure,
at the time the Commission was cut back, only rough estimates, rather
than complete statistics, concerning Commission operations were avail-
able; but these estimates, as an indication of Commission performance,
played no part in the legislative debate.48
The Bail Commission has been only hamstrung, not destroyed.
The important function of protecting indigent defendants remains in
the commissioner's power.49 But the larger Commission purpose-to
ease needlessly harsh bail conditions-has been seriously impaired50
V. Commission Influence on Police
Three indications of Bail Commission influence on police attitudes
can be found in release practices during the two months after Commis-
sion curtailment, July 1 to September 1, 1969:
1. As expected, the non-surety release rate dropped, but only to about
35 per cent. This "net" rise from the pre-Commission rate of 21 per
cent can only be ascribed to the educational impact of the nine months
of Commission operations.5 '
48. On June 2, 1969, the Senate of the General Assembly passed Public Act 826, which
curtailed the Commission to its present role. This Act had previously been passed by the
Connecticut House of Representatives. However, on June 4th, the last day of the regular
session, the Senate passed a motion to reopen the Bill. No action was taken on the re-
opened bill, and the assembly adjourned. It was at first thought that the Senate motion
had voided the amending act, and that the bail commission was to remain as it was.
However, objections were raised to the Senate reopening of the measure by supporters
of Public Act 826, and the Attorney General of Connecticut was asked to determine if
the Senate action was valid. The Attorney General ruled that the Senate in reopening
Public Act 826 was required to take more action than merely passing a motion to re-
open, and that "inasmuch as the Bill was not authored or totally rejected by a con-
current vote of both Houses," it should be forwarded to the Governor for signature or
veto. On the basis of this ruling, the Bill was forwarded to the Governor and signed.
This parliamentary technicality was quite controversial.
For newspaper accounts of the debate over the changes in the Bail Commission, see
The Hartford Times, March 30, 1969, Sunday Magazine at 4; The Hartford Times, June
16, 1969, at 1, col. 1-8; New Haven Journal Courier, June 18, 1969, at 1, col. 3-5; The Hart-
ford Times, June 15, 1969; The Hartford Courant, June 11, 1969, at 28, col. 1-6; New
Haven Journal Courier, at 1, col. 4-5; New London Day, May 7, 1969, at 1, col. 5-8.
49. The reduction in staff, of course, means that in the rural drcuits, v;here defen-
dants are scattered over large areas, commissioners will be somewhat slower to remedy
unnecessary detentions. However, in Connecticut, detention of indigents for failure
to post bond is less of a problem in rural than in urban areas.
50. Perhaps, the greatest problem presented by the change in the Commission role
wiil be the bearing of relatively high bondsmen's charges (see note 42, supra) by those
who are able to post bonds. If the system works properly, there ought to be few de-
fendants detained who could have qualified for release under Commission policies.
There is some danger, however, that bail commissioners, now in a somewhat chastened
position with respect to the police, will be inclined not to disturb police determination
of bail conditions.
51. This 55% release rate does not reflect the changes to non-surety conditions
made by bail commissioners after surety bonds had been set by police. That is, the
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2. Although statistics are unavailable, many bail commissioners re-
port that arresting officers telephone them, apparently from habit, for
advice as to bail determination for their defendants. If this pattern of
independent consultation continues, then the "education" of police
departments toward non-surety release can also be expected to continue.
3. Another carry-over from the Commission operations is the written
interview form. Although not legally required, 2 the standard Bail
Commission written interview form, which is somewhat slanted in favor
of non-surety release, has been adopted by most police departments."
VI. Conclusion
In its nine months of full-blown operation, the Connecticut Bail
Commission demonstrated that a high rate of non-surety release, on a
statewide basis and without the restrictions of an experimental pro-
gram, can be achieved without a rise in the rate of non-appearances.
The high release rate shows the value of an independent agent to inter-
view and set bail, where police attitudes toward bail are generally
conservative. It is deplorable that this program, highly successful under
objective criteria, was curtailed.54
Arguably the best model for a bail-determining agency is one in
which the bail agent plays a "secondary" role, dealing only with de-
tained defendants, as in the Connecticut program at present; the police
officer is seen as the most efficient agent to fix bail initially, because of
his proximity to the arrest process. And the bail commissioner is viewed
as unnecessary until a defendant is demonstrably unable to secure his
release through ordinary channels. This theoretical position is strength-
ened by the undeniably greater political attractiveness of a "secondary"
system of bail commissioners. Not only is the budget of such a system
Commission efforts to release indigent defendants are not included in the overall release
rate of 35 per cent. The impact of these changes in police-set surety bonds on the
non-surety release rate cannot be precisely measured; but the Chief Bail Commissioner
estimates that it is not more than five per cent.
52. Public Act 826 demands only that the "police officer shall promptly Interview
such person to obtain information relevant to the terms and conditions of his release
from custody." Pub. Act No. 826, § 2 (July 1, 1969); § 54-63c, [1969] Conn. Legig. Service
1257.
53. A related factor which may add to the police use of non-surety release Is that
for the imposition of a surety bond the statute now requires specific written reasons,
to which a police officer may presumably be held to answer in court. CoN. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-63c (1969).
54. The use of summons procedures for misdemeanants in lieu of actual arrest
someday may reduce the inequities in bail. But until this advanced thinking permeates
the legislative climate, and unless summons procedures are applied also to serious
"offenses, liberalization of pretrial release standards must be continued.
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smaller, but also the authority of the police force is not materially di-
minished, which is important in a political climate of "law and order."
But the argument for such a secondary bail commission rests on
the assumption that, since most defendants are in fact law-breakers,
we are justified in imposing upon them the pretrial "penalty" of a cash
outlay for a surety bond. If police officers would readily adopt the use
of non-surety devices, of course, we would not need the commissioner.
But the Connecticut experience has demonstrated that police cling ten-
aciously to the use of surety bonds. Their rigid attitudes toward bail
are changeable only by startling institutional proof, probably effective
only when seen by police at the local level, that the traditional system
of surety bonds is less than Goa-given. Unless some vigorous method
of altering police attitudes were devised to accompany it, the secondary
system of bail commissioners would leave virtually untouched the im-
position of surety bonds on non-indigent defendants.
The detention of otherwise releasable indigent defendants and the
fees paid for unnecessary surety bonds are costs stemming from rigid
police attitudes. Until these unjustified costs can be eliminated, they
ought to be borne by the public at large, as an administrative cost of
our system of criminal justice. A secondary system of bail commis-
sioners would properly shift a part of the burden, in freeing indigents
who meet the release criteria. But the fees paid by non-indigent
defendants for unnecessary surety bonds would remain a barely visible
but nonetheless impermissible assignment to defendants of what are
properly social costs, and they would have the effect of a penalty as-
sessed before trial.
Another objection to a secondary system of bail commissioners lies in
its assumption that the police officer is the most efficient agent for set-
fing bail. In terms of the effectiveness of public expenditure, it must be
'noted that the role of the bail commissioner can be adequately filled by
a person with much less training than is necessary for a police officer;
and in Connecticut the salaries of the bail commissioners are substan-
tially lower than typical police salaries.r 5 In addition, even in a political
- 5. The salary of a Grade A patrolman in New Haven is over $9,000 per year; on
July 1, 1970, it will increase to over $10,000. The salary of an assistant bail commissioner
working in the station house is only $5240 per year. See note 43 supra. Also, in many
cases the desk officer who is responsible for interviewing defendants is above the rank
of patrolman.
A basic complaint of the opponents of a "front line" bail commission is its relatively
high cost in the rural and suburban areas. In the twelve smallest circuits (see note 18
supra), one bail commissioner and two assistants were appointed to provide round.the
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climate favorable to police expenditures, police departments today are
hard-pressed to meet the various demands on their energies. Especially
if the secondary system of bail commissioners necessitates a substantial
interview of the defendant by police, a burden is being placed on the
police departments which they can ill afford.50
Wherever bail is thoroughly liberalized, whether by a primary
system of bail commissioners or by intensive police education, there
is the danger of a rise in the incidence of "pre-trial recidivism," or
crimes committed by released defendants. In Connecticut, statistics
on pre-trial recidivism are not available, but the lack of public dis-
cussion of the matter suggests that the problem was not seen as great.
In Connecticut, the incidence of crimes by indigents is concentrated
in the few densely populated urban areas. The generally lower non-
surety release rates in the urban circuits may be in part explained
by tougher treatment of indigents who are likely recidivists; and in all
circuits, narcotics addicts and defendants with long records of serious
crimes-those most likely to commit crime before trial-were rarely
given a non-surety release.
This analysis suggests that, although the sole stated criterion for
non-surety release is the probability of appearance at trial, the bail
commissioners often consider the danger of recidivism in setting
release conditions. This practice, of course, does not square with the
constitutional purpose of bail, to return the defendant to trial, But
as many have noted, bail in the United States has always been used to
dock coverage; this is probably the minimum number of full time persons needed to
interview every defendant at all hours. However, the Commission personnel In the
outlying areas were not as busy, nor did they interview as many persons as those In
the urban centers.
If the salary expense of the full time Commission personnel in the smaller Circuits Is
viewed as unjustified, a possible solution would be to place them on a fee basis; that is,
the Bail Commissioners would be paid only a certain fee when an interview Is required,
the cost to be borne by the State. However, the soundness of such an approach Is ques.
tionable. For example, if the fee were five dollars, the Bail Commissioner might be re-
luctant to get out of bed and drive to a distant police station. Conversely, if the fee were
much higher, the total cost of a fee system would probably exceed the cost of regular full
time personnel.
56. Although some police officials were happy to see the initial bail deternilna.
tion returned to their jurisdiction, the administrative burden of completing even a
relatively brief bail interview form in the major urban departments has not been
welcomed. Some police officers report that it is not so much the time taken to In.
terview, but the verification of the defendant's community ties that is too time con-
suming, sometimes taking hours. This is less of a problem for the rural and suburban
departments, but nevertheless there have been complaints from these departments also.
Before the Bail Commission, of course, police were not required to interview the
defendant, much less to investigate his community ties.
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detain potential recidivists. Bail reform has spotlighted this sub rosa
practice, without providing an effective alternative for protecting the
community; and hence the demand has arisen for "preventive de-
tention" of likely recidivists. Equipped with no explicit means of
coping with the problem of crime by released defendants, the Con-
necticut bail commissioners seem to have dealt with it in the time-
honored fashion, by refusing to grant non-surety release to those
defendants they considered dangerous. Until criminal courts are given
the resources to erase the large backlogs of pending cases, the problem
will continue to be confronted either by departure from stated release
standards or through some legal method of "preventive detention."
APPENDIX I
BA!L Cozn.iusoN STATtsrics
OcroBFR 1, 1968, TO JUNE 30, 1969
Non-
surety Num.
Released Non-surety Cases her
Bail Without Surety* Cases Dis. Pend- Flee-
Circuit Eligible Bond % Set % Posed of ing ing %70
1 3211 1450 45 1559 48 1141 309 38 8.3
2 3930 2364 60 1556 40 1935 429 97 5.0
3 2260 1598 70 662 30 1202 396 16 1.3
4 2701 1399 52 1302 48 994 405 21 2.1
5 1409 915 65 494 35 753 162 23 3.1
6 4710 3324 70 1386 30 2645 679 90 3.4
7 1504 752 50 752 50 692 120 16 2.5
8 1420 903 64 517 36 752 151 21 2.8
9 1584 970 61 614 39 636 334 9 1.4
10 3628 2792 77 836 23 2253 539 47 2.1
11 1552 1187 76 365 24 954 233 20 2.1
12 2376 1454 61 922 39 1180 274 58 4.9
13 1682 924 56 758 44 670 274 13 1.9
14 6507 2348 36 3870 59 1681 667 56 3.3
15 2226 1789 80 437 20 1455 334 24 1.6
16 1001 810 80 191 20 648 162 15 23
17 1144 889 78 255 22 777 112 11 1.4
18 1329 966 73 363 27 837 129 18 2.2
State
Total 44,174 26,834 61% 16,849 38% 21,145 5,689 593 2.8%
* Of bail-eligible defendants, 491 were unaccounted for in the Bail Commission
records. Of these, 202 were in the Ist Circuit, 289 in the 14th Circuit.
** These percentages are computed by dividing the number fleeing by the total cases
disposed of.
529
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 79: 513, 1970
APPENDIX II
COMPARISON OF RELEASE RATES PRIOR TO THE COMMISSION, DURING FULL COMMISSION
OPERATIONS, AND AFTER CURTAILMENT OF THE COMISaSION
Net Increase
Percentage ROR Percentage ROR December, 1967
October 1, 1968, July 2,1969, to
Percentage ROR to to July-August,
Circuit December, 1967** Julyl, 19690*0 August31,1969**** 1969
1 22 45 30 + 8
2 1 60 13 +12
3 18 70 55 + 87
4 24 52 63 +39
5 9 65 10 + 1
6 43 70 35 - 8
7 9 50 12 + 3
8 9 64 44 + 35
9 25 61 63 + 38
10 20 77 49 +29
11 47 76 56 + 9
12 36 61 53 + 17
13 27 56 17 - 10
14 13 36 13 0
15 27 80 38 + 11
16 26 80 32 + 6
17 18 78 45 +27
18 23 73 77 +54
State
Total 21% 61% 35% +14%
* Released on Own Recognizance; these figures include those released on non-surety
bond.
Prior to the beginning of operations of the Conmecticut Ball Commission.
During Commission operations.
The two months immediately following curtailment of the Bail Commission.
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